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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Evidence from the U.S. and some other countries indicates that organized wholesale 
markets for electrical energy and operating reserves do not provide adequate incentives to 
stimulate the proper quantity or mix of generating capacity consistent with mandatory 
reliability criteria.  A large part of the problem can be associated with the failure of 
wholesale spot market prices for energy and operating reserves to rise to high enough 
levels during periods when generating capacity is fully utilized. Reforms to wholesale 
energy markets, the introduction of well-design forward capacity markets, and 
symmetrical treatment of demand response and generating capacity resources to respond 
to market and institutional imperfections are discussed.  This policy reform program is 
compatible with improving the efficiency of spot wholesale electricity markets, the 
continued evolution of competitive retail markets, and restores incentives for efficient 
investment in generating capacity consistent with operating reliability criteria applied by 
system operators.  It also responds to investment disincentives that have been associated 
with volatility in wholesale energy prices, limited hedging opportunities and to concerns 
about regulatory opportunism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Policymakers in many countries are expressing concerns that competitive 
wholesale electricity markets are not providing appropriate incentives to stimulate 
“adequate” investment in new generating capacity at the right time, in the right places, 
and using the right technologies.  These concerns are often expressed in the context of 
concerns about “supply security,” “reliability,” “resource adequacy,” or “supply 
diversity.”  In most cases the concerns have been raised as policymakers observe growing 
electricity demand, shrinking reserve margins and rising prices but little evidence of 
investment in new generating capacity responding to balance supply and demand 
consistent with traditional metrics for generation resource “adequacy.”  Many economists 
and market enthusiasts dismiss these concerns as reflecting the misguided conclusions of 
nervous politicians and system engineers who do not understand how markets work and 
who have not made the intellectual transition to a world of liberalized electricity markets.  
Nevertheless, there are a growing number of recent situations in which state-owned 
entities have stepped in to contract for additional generating capacity or where 
policymakers have required incumbent distribution companies to contract for new 
                                                 
1 This paper builds on research discussed in Joskow (2005), Joskow (2006) and Joskow and Tirole (2005a).  
I have benefited enormously from conversations with Jean Tirole and Steve Stoft about these issues and, in 
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supplies to mitigate resource adequacy concerns (e.g. Chile, Brazil, New Zealand, 
Ontario, California). 
 In this paper I will argue that, at least based on U.S. experience with organized 
competitive wholesale power markets for electric energy and operating reserves, there are 
a number of market imperfections and institutional constraints that have the effect of 
keeping wholesale prices for energy and operating reserves below their efficient levels 
during hours when prices should be very high and provide net revenues to contribute to 
the capital costs of generating facilities.  If this situation is allowed to persist it will in 
turn lead to underinvestment in generating capacity and to higher rates of power supply 
emergencies and involuntary rationing (blackouts). These problems have been 
exacerbated in the U.S. by instability in the wholesale market designs and market rules 
that characterize these wholesale markets (continuing reforms of the reforms), uncertain 
commitments by government policymakers to liberalization (calls for re-regulation), and 
an incomplete transition to a stable retail competition framework. At least some of these 
problems are likely to characterize competitive electricity markets in some other 
countries.  That’s the bad news.  The good news is that these problems can be fixed with 
appropriate reforms to wholesale and retail market designs and credible government 
commitments to market liberalization.  
 The concerns about investment in new generating capacity reflect one or more of 
several interrelated groups of real or imagined problems with competitive wholesale 
electricity markets.  First, it has been argued that competitive wholesale electricity 
markets for energy and operating reserves do not and perhaps cannot credibly provide 
adequate net revenues to attract investment in generation to meet conventional operating 
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and investment reliability criteria.  According to this view, spot wholesale electricity 
market prices for energy and operating reserves will simply not be high enough to cover 
both the operating costs and the capital investment costs (including an appropriate risk 
adjusted cost of capital) required to attract new investment in long-lived generating 
capacity to support a least cost generation supply portfolio.  Wholesale spot market prices 
in turn are reflected in forward prices for power that are too low as well through the 
normal operation of inter-temporal arbitrage behavior.  I will follow Cramton and Stoft 
(2006) and refer to this as the “missing money” problem.  
 Second, it is sometimes argued that short-term wholesale electricity prices are too 
volatile to support new investment in long-lived capital intensive generating capacity 
without support from long term contractual agreements between generators and 
wholesale or retail supply intermediaries.  Retail customers, with a few exceptions, show 
little interest in entering into contracts of more than two or three years duration and, for 
this and perhaps other reasons, a liquid voluntary forward market for longer duration 
contracts that investors can rely on to hedge electricity market risks has not emerged 
naturally.  A variant on this “uncertainty barrier” argument is that the problem is not that 
investments will not be forthcoming at some price level, but rather that the cost of capital 
used by investors to evaluate investments in new generating capacity that will operate in 
competitive wholesale spot markets for energy and operating reserves is so high that it 
implies electricity prices that are even higher than those that would have been 
experienced under the old regime of regulated vertically integrated utilities where market, 
construction, and generator performance risks are largely shifted to consumers by fiat 
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through the regulatory process.  This then turns into an argument against liberalized 
electricity sectors. 
 Finally, it is sometimes argued that market rules and market institutions change so 
frequently and that opportunities for regulators to “hold-up” incumbents by imposing 
new market or regulatory constraints on market prices is so great that uncertainty about 
future government policies acts as a deterrent to new investment.  As I will discuss in 
more detail below, this is especially problematic in electricity markets because a large 
fraction of the net revenues earned to compensate investors for the capital they have 
committed to generating capacity relies on very high spot market prices realized during a 
very small number of hours each year.  The potential opportunity for market rules and 
regulatory actions to keep prices from rising to their appropriate levels even in a few 
hours each year when efficient prices would be very high can seriously undermine 
investment incentives. 
 In this paper I will focus on the first set of concerns --- what Cramton and Stoft 
(2006) call the missing money problem ---, discuss empirical evidence indicating that it is 
a real problem in the organized wholesale power markets in the U.S., and identify its 
causes.  I do not think too much of the argument that price uncertainty per se deters 
investment, though I will discuss how restrictions on the natural evolution of retail 
market institutions can contribute to a failure of normal market-based risk allocation 
mechanism to operate properly.  The issues related to investment disincentives caused by 
opportunism or hold-up concerns are real and require more attention.  While mandating 
that retail suppliers enter into long term contracts may be a solution to this problem from 
the perspective of investors (Joskow (1987)), it is a solution that is not compatible with 
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the effective diffusion of retail electricity competition and may deter further 
improvements in wholesale market institutions.  Finally, I discuss a series of reforms 
built around (a) improvements in spot wholesale energy markets and (b) the introduction 
of forward capacity markets with particular attributes that can resolve most of the 
problems that have been identified and are compatible with the continued evolution of a 
healthy retail competition framework. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 Questions have been raised about whether competitive wholesale and retail 
markets for power would produce adequate generating capacity investment incentives to 
balance supply and demand efficiently since the transition to competitive electricity 
markets began.  Until 2001, the wholesale market system in England and Wales provided 
for additional capacity payments to be made to all generators scheduled to supply during 
hours when supply was unusually tight (i.e. when the loss-of-load probability was 
relatively high).2  The wholesale markets created and managed by the Eastern 
Independent System Operators (ISOs) in the U.S. during the late 1990s have continued 
their traditional policies of requiring distribution companies (or more generally “load 
serving entities” or "LSEs" to encompass competitive retail electricity suppliers) to enter 
into contracts for capacity to meet their projected peak demand plus an administratively 
determined reserve margin.   Argentina’s competitive electricity market system also 
included capacity payments to stimulate investment in reserve generating capacity.  In 
Chile, distribution utilities are required to enter into forward contracts to meet forecast 
demand plus a reserve margin. The system in Columbia also imposes capacity 
                                                 
2 This payment mechanism was dropped when the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) system 
was introduced in 2001. 
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obligations. California’s wholesale electricity market design did not impose capacity, 
reserve or forward contract obligations and the California electricity crisis of 2000-2001 
is sometimes (erroneously) blamed on underinvestment in generating capacity.  Capacity 
obligations are now being introduced in California in the form of generating reserve 
margin criteria and forward contracting obligations.   On the other hand, the wholesale 
market in England and Wales abandoned capacity payments when the New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA) where introduced and Texas (ERCOT) has never had 
capacity payments or capacity obligations.  There appears to be not interest in introducing 
them in either market.  
 Questions about whether wholesale markets will bring forth adequate investments 
in generating capacity arises naturally from the unusual characteristics of electricity 
supply and demand: (a) large variations in demand over the course of a year; (b) non-
storability; (c) the need to physically balance supply and demand at every point on the 
network continuously to meet physical constraints on voltage, frequency, and stability; 
(d) the inability to control power flows to most individual consumers; (e) limited use of 
real time pricing by retail consumers, and (f) that even under the best of circumstances 
(i.e. with effective real time pricing of energy and operating reserves) non-price 
mechanisms (blackouts) will have to be relied upon from time to time to ration 
imbalances between supply and demand to meet physical operating reliability criteria 
because markets cannot clear fast enough to do so.3   
                                                 
3 In response to questions about why demand response was not relied upon to respond to the sudden loss of 
1,100 Mw of generating capacity that led to rolling blackouts in Texas on April 17, 2006, a representative 
of the ISO is reported to have said: “In this case, when four generators tripped, it was just bang-bang-bang-
bang.”  Electric Transmission Week, April 24, 2006, pages 1 and 12, SNL Financial LC. 
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 These attributes have a number of implications.  First, a large amount of 
generating capacity that is available to meet peak demand plus the associated operating 
reserve requirements supplies relatively small amounts of energy during the year.  For 
example, in New England in 2001, 93% of the energy was supplied by 55% of the 
installed generating capacity while the remaining 45% of the capacity supplied only 
about 7% of the energy.4   Potential investors in new generating capacity must expect to 
cover their variable operating costs, their fixed operating and maintenance costs, and their 
capital costs from sales of energy and operating reserves over the life of generating 
capacity under consideration.  The return of and on the associated capital investment in 
new generating capacity is the difference between the prices they receive for generation 
services (including capacity payments, if any) and their operating (primarily fuel) costs.  
The profitability of generating units that are likely to operate only for a relatively small 
number of hours in each year (“peaking capacity”) are especially sensitive to the level of 
prices that are realized during the small number of high demand hours in which they 
provide energy or operating reserves. 
 Second, the generating capacity available to supply energy at any point in time 
must always be greater than the demand for energy at that point in time as a result of the 
need to carry “inventory” in the form of generators providing frequency regulation and 
operating reserve services.  That is, generating capacity (or in principle demand response) 
must be available that is either “spinning” or available to start up quickly to provide 
energy to balance supply and demand at each location on the network in response to real 
time variations in demand and unplanned equipment outages.  When these operating 
                                                 
4 Sithe Energy presentation, IAEE, Boston Chapter,  February 19, 2003. 
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reserves fall below a certain level because available generating capacity and demand 
response resources are fully utilized (e.g. 7% of demand), system operators begin to take 
actions to reduce demand administratively according to a pre-specified hierarchy of 
“operating reserve shortage” actions.  The final actions in this hierarchy are voltage 
reductions and non-price rationing of demand (rolling blackouts).   I will discuss system 
operator behavior during such "scarcity" or "operating reserve shortage" conditions in 
more detail below as they play a central role in explaining the missing money problem in 
the U.S.  
 Finally, limited reliance on real time pricing, the inability to control real time 
power flows to all but the largest retail consumers, and the potential for a network 
collapse undermine the ability of market mechanisms to choose the efficient level of 
system reliability. Whether the market can choose the efficient level of reliability or not, 
a variety of administrative reliability rules and operating protocols have been carried over 
from the old regime of vertically integrated monopoly to the world of liberalized 
electricity markets.  These reliability rules have important implications for market 
behavior and performance and about assessments of the “adequacy” of investment in 
generating capacity and the associated probability of rolling blackouts and network 
collapses. 
 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE 
IN THEORY 
To oversimplify for expositional purposes, a well functioning perfectly 
competitive wholesale electricity market will operate in one of two states of nature.  
Under typical operating conditions (State 1), market clearing prices for energy and 
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operating reserves should equal the marginal (opportunity) cost of the last increment of 
generating capacity that just clears supply and demand at each point in time.5  In the case 
of wholesale electric energy supply, this price is the marginal cost of producing a little 
more or a little less energy from the generating unit on the margin in the bid-based merit 
order.  Figure 1 depicts the spot market demand for electricity and the competitive supply 
curve for electricity under typical operating conditions (State 1).  Inframarginal 
generating units earn net revenues or quasi-rents that contribute to the recovery of their 
fixed operating and capital costs whenever the market clearing price exceeds their own 
marginal generation costs.  In the case of operating reserves, the efficient price is 
(roughly) equal to the difference between the price of energy and the marginal cost of the 
next increment of generation that could supply energy profitably if the price of energy 
were slightly higher plus any direct costs incurred to provide operating reserves (e.g. 
costs associated with spinning).  This price for operating reserves is equal to the marginal 
opportunity cost incurred by generators standing in reserve rather than supplying energy.  
Under typical operating conditions (State 1) the price of operating reserves will be very 
small --- close to zero, and far below the price of energy.  
The second wholesale market state (State 2) is associated with a relatively small 
number of hours each year when there would be excess demand at a wholesale price that 
is equal to the marginal production cost of the last increment of generating capacity that 
can physically be made available on the network to supply energy plus operating 
reserves.  In this case, the market must be cleared “on the demand side.”  That is, 
consumers bidding to obtain energy would bid prices up to a (much) higher level 
                                                 
5 This will, of course, also be the value consumers place on this energy at the margin where supply and 
demand are equal. 
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reflecting the value that consumers place on consuming less electricity as demand is 
reduced to match the limited supplies available to the market (or value of lost energy or 
load -- VOLL).  This second state is depicted in Figure 2.  In Figure 2, the area labeled 
Rmc represents the quasi-rents that would be earned by infra-marginal generators if the 
wholesale price is equal to the marginal generating cost of the least efficient generator on 
the system required to clear the market.  The area labeled Rs reflects the additional 
scarcity rents from allowing prices to rise high enough to ration scarce capacity on the 
demand side to balance supply and demand.  In what follows, I will refer to the 
conditions depicted in Figure 2 as competitive “scarcity” or “shortage” conditions.6  
Under competitive scarcity conditions the competitive market clearing price of 
energy will now generally be much higher than the marginal production cost of supplying 
the last available increment of energy from generating capacity available to the network, 
reflecting the high opportunity cost (value of lost energy or lost load – VOLL in what 
follows) that consumers place on reducing consumption by a significant amount on very 
short notice.  Furthermore, while the price of operating reserves will continue to be equal 
to the marginal opportunity cost incurred by generators standing in reserve rather than 
supplying energy, the opportunity cost of standing in reserve rather than supplying 
energy will rise significantly as well in response to the higher “scarcity value” of energy.  
All generating units actually supplying energy and operating reserves in the spot market 
during scarcity conditions would earn substantial “scarcity rents.”   These scarcity rents in 
turn help to cover the fixed capital and operating costs of all generating facilities.  
                                                 
6 To distinguish it from contrived scarcity resulting from suppliers withholding supplies from the market to 
drive up prices. 
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In a well functioning competitive electricity market, price signals for energy 
bought and sold in the market not only induce the right amount of generating capacity 
(and associated levels of reliability), but also the right mix of generating technologies.  
Because electricity is non-storable and demand varies widely over the course of a year, 
the most economical portfolio of generating plants will include technologies with a 
variety of capital cost/operating cost ratios.  Base load generating facilities (typically 
nuclear or coal) have relatively high capital costs and low operating costs.  These 
facilities are economical to build if it is efficient to operate them for a large fraction of 
the hours of each year.  Intermediate load facilities (typically gas or oil fueled) have 
lower capital costs and higher operating costs than base load facilities.  These facilities 
typically operate for 20% to 50% of the hours during the year.  Finally, peaking facilities 
have the lowest capital costs and the highest operating costs per unit of capacity.  These 
facilities are expected to be economical to operate from a few hours per year up to (say) 
20% of the hours during the year.7 
For base load and cycling units, the net revenues they earn during scarcity 
conditions may account for a significant fraction of the total net revenues they earn 
throughout the year.  For peaking capacity that supplies energy or operating reserves 
primarily during such scarcity conditions, the net revenues they earn during these periods 
will account for substantially all of the net revenues available to cover their fixed costs 
(capital, maintenance and operating.).  The number of hours in which “scarcity” 
conditions emerge depends upon the amount of generating capacity that has been 
                                                 
7 There does not exist a distribution of generating technologies that reflect a continuum of capital/operating 
cost ratios.  However, the more options there are along such a distribution the better can be the match 
between generating technologies and the number of hours they will operate each hear to meet demand. 
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installed and is physically available to operate relative to the tail of the distribution of 
aggregate demand realizations during the year.  The quantity and type of generating 
capacity that is physically available to the network in a market context will then depend 
on investors in generating capacity balancing the costs of additional investments against 
the net revenues they expect to receive, including the “scarcity” rents produced under 
State 2 conditions, from spot market sales and through sales pursuant to forward contracts 
if suppliers choose to hedge market prices risks.  The prices for such forward contracts 
are necessarily linked directly to expected wholesale spot market prices for energy 
through intertemporal arbitrage and consumer and supplier preferences for market price 
risk.  
  This simple theoretical analysis of a well-performing wholesale market has so 
far largely ignored uncertainty.  Uncertainty enters short run operating (dispatch) 
behavior and long run investment behavior in a number of ways.  Electricity demand is 
uncertain in both the long run and the short run.  From a long run investment perspective, 
electricity demand depends on the average level of future electricity prices, the prices of 
substitute fuels, the replacement rates of appliances and equipment and both the level and 
composition of aggregate economic activity.  In the short run, given the stock of 
appliances and equipment, electricity demand is particularly sensitive to weather 
conditions since weather variations lead to large variations in heating and cooling 
demand.  Short run price and income elasticities are very low.  On the supply side, from 
an investment perspective, there is uncertainty about future electricity prices, fuel prices 
and the rates of entry and exit of new generating capacity.  In the short run, there is 
uncertainty about unplanned outages of generating facilities and spot prices, reflecting the 
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interactions of uncertain demand and uncertain supply.  Uncertainty on the supply and 
demand side introduces volatility into spot prices over and above the natural variability in 
prices associated with variable demand and differences in the short run marginal costs of 
operating diverse generating technologies.  It will also lead to a least cost investment 
portfolio that will have more nominal generating capacity (measured before taking 
account of forced outage rates) than the expected (mean) level of peak demand.  The 
difference between the nominal generating capacity on the system and the expected peak 
demand is the system’s expected "reserve margin."  
Historically, when the electricity sector was composed of vertically integrated 
regulated monopolies, these aspects of uncertainty affected investment and operating 
decisions in important ways. From an investment perspective, long-term planning 
protocols reflected longer term uncertainty on the supply and demand sides by 
establishing target “reserve margins” over an about the expected level of peak electricity 
demand.  These reserve margins were based on forecast levels of peak demand and 
forecasts levels of capacity, assuming that all of the capacity would be available at the 
time of system peak.  So, for example, in the U.S., systems were planned to yield an 
average reserve margin of 15% to 20%.  The reserve margin typically could include 
contracted demand response that the system operator could control but did not assume 
that demand would otherwise respond to rapid changes in real-time prices.   
From a short run operating perspective, the quantity of generating capacity 
scheduled to be available to supply electrical energy includes capacity used for frequency 
regulation, operating reserves and replacement reserves.  In a typical system these 
“operating reserves” account for an additional 10% to 12% of generating capacity above 
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the actual demand for energy at any particular time.  Generating capacity is scheduled in 
this way as a result of the perceived need to have “quick response” generation resources 
available to respond to short-term fluctuations in demand and unplanned outages of 
generating and transmission capacity, in order to keep the probability of non-price 
rationing (rolling blackouts) and cascading network outages (network collapse) very low.  
These operating and investment criteria are typically enshrined in various engineering 
reliability rules that have been carried over without much if any changes into the world of 
liberalized electricity markets. 
The role of operating reserves in real electricity systems changes the static notion 
of a capacity constraint in real time operations as typically reflected in simple market 
models (e.g. as in Figure 2). Capacity constraints are now “soft” constraints that exceed 
the actual demand on the system at any particular time.  In normal operations, the 
generating capacity scheduled by the system operator to supply energy quickly through 
the wholesale energy and operating reserve markets will include about 10% operating 
reserves of one type or another over and above the demand for energy.  When this target 
level of operating reserves cannot be maintained because there is no additional generating 
capacity or demand response available for the system operator to call upon, an “operating 
reserve emergency” or “operating reserve shortage” will be declared.  That is, the 
capacity constraint is effectively reached when the generating capacity available to the 
system operator falls below (say) 110% of current demand (or forecast demand for the 
next few hours).  Accordingly, a more realistic characterization of capacity constraints 
(State 2 conditions) depicted in Figure 2 should include operating reserves in total 
capacity required to meet any given level of demand.   Moreover, as I will discuss in 
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more detail presently, the "soft" capacity constraint created by the operating reserve 
targets and system operator reliability protocols in the face of operating reserve 
constraints significantly complicates the price formation process during scarcity 
conditions when generating capacity is effectively fully utililized. 
 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES8 
 The simple economics of the efficient utilization, investment and pricing for an 
electric generating system is usefully clarified with a couple of simple numerical 
examples that ignore uncertainty.  Table 1 displays the parameters of three hypothetical 
electric generating technologies with different capital cost/operating cost ratios and a 
hypothetical load duration curve representing the number of hours during the year the 
aggregate system demand or "load" reaches any particular demand level.  The capital 
costs of a generating facility are fixed costs once the investment to build it has been 
made. The operating costs vary directly with the production of electrical energy from the 
generating facility.9  There is a “base load” technology with relatively high capital costs 
(annualized) and low operating costs.  Next there is an “intermediate load” technology 
with lower capital costs and higher operating costs.  Finally, there is a “peaking” 
technology with still lower capital costs and higher operating costs.  In the example, 
demand is less than or equal to 10,000Mw for the entire year (8760 hours) and is 22,000 
Mw for only one hour during the year.  System demands between 10,000 and 22,000 Mw 
                                                 
8 These examples and the associated discussion of investment and dispatch behavior should be familiar to 
anyone who has read the old literature on peak load pricing and investment for electricity.  See for 
example, Turvey (1968), Boiteux (1951, 1960),  Joskow (1976), Crew and Kleinfdorfer (1976).  Well 
functioning markets should reproduced these idealized "central planning" results. 
 
9 For the purposes of this example we will ignore so-called fixed operation and maintenance expenses 
which are incurred each year simply to keep the plant available to produce electricity after the initial 
investment in it has been sunk. 
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are realized for between 8760 and one hour during the year.   For now, we will assume 
that the annual hourly system demand profile summarized in the load duration curve is 
not sensitive to prices.  This assumption will be relaxed presently.  We also ignore 
uncertainty on the demand side and the supply side for now. 
Total costs (capital plus operating) per unit of generating capacity vary with the 
number of hours that the capacity is utilized to produce electricity each year.  More 
importantly, from an investor's perspective the comparative total costs of the three 
technologies depends upon how many hours each year it is anticipated that each will be 
economical to “dispatch” to supply electricity.  If a generating unit is expected to operate 
economically 8760 hours per year, the base load technology is the lowest cost choice.  If 
generating capacity is expected to be economical to run, for example, only 4,000 hours 
per year, then intermediate load technology is the lowest cost choice.  If the capacity is 
expected to be economical to run, for example, 200 hours per year, then peaking 
technology is the least cost option.  These relationships for this numerical example are 
depicted in the top panel of Figure 3. The top panel yields the duration of demand at 
which each technology is economical from a total cost (capital plus operating) 
perspective.  The lowest cost mix of investments in generating technology can then be 
determined by “fitting” the total cost of building and operating each generating 
technology to the load duration curve for the system (since electricity cannot be stored).  
This can be accomplished graphically by including the load duration curve in the bottom 
panel in Figure 3 and matching the technology in the top panel to the load duration in the 
bottom panel at which it is the least cost technology.  The capacity of each technology 
that makes up the least cost generating investment portfolio can then be read off of the 
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vertical axis in the bottom panel of Figure 3 at the load duration cutoff points for each 
technology. 
For this example, Table 2 displays the least costs mix of generating capacity, the 
total costs (operating plus capital) for each technology and for the system in the 
aggregate, and the most efficient utilization duration (running hours) for each technology 
consistent with the parameters in Table 1 and the graphical representation in Figure 3.   In 
this example, the least cost mix includes a lot of base load capacity, a much smaller 
amount of intermediate capacity and an even smaller amount of peaking capacity.   
One can think of the generating investment and utilization program displayed in 
Table 2 as what a (imaginary) well-informed benevolent social planner would come up 
with.  That is, this is a benchmark result against which market behavior and performance 
can be compared.  The question then for evaluating the behavior and performance of a 
competitive wholesale market is whether and how market prices can provide incentives 
for decentralized decisions by profit-maximizing investors to replicate the efficient 
outcome.  It should be obviously immediately that except when demand reaches 22,000 
Mw and fully utilizes all of the generating capacity in the least cost program that the 
market will operate in a regime where there is “excess capacity” as in Figure 1 (State 1) 
above.  In a perfectly competitive market, prices will reflect short run marginal operating 
costs under these “State 1” conditions.  When demand is less than or equal to 14,694 Mw, 
base load capacity is marginal and the perfectly competitive market price will be 
$20/Mwh.  When demand lies between 14,694 Mw and 19,511 Mw the marginal unit is 
the intermediate technology and the perfectly competitive market price will be $35/Mwh.  
Finally, as demand rises above 19,511 Mw, peaking capacity is marginal and the 
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perfectly competitive market price will be $80/Mwh up to the point where capacity is 
fully utilized. Table 3 displays the number of hours that each technology is the marginal 
supplier. Let me defer for now a discussion of what the price would be when demand and 
capacity are both exactly 22,000 Mw in this example.  
Table 4 displays the revenues, total costs and difference between revenues and 
total costs (shortfall or net revenue gap) for each technology and in the aggregate under 
the short run marginal cost pricing scenario just discussed.  It should be clear that short 
run marginal cost pricing yields revenues that are not nearly adequate to cover the total 
costs for any technology or total generating costs in the aggregate at the efficient 
investment levels.  The shortfall turns out to be $80,000/Mw of installed capacity for all 
technologies.  Clearly, decentralized markets will not attract investment to support a least 
cost generation investment portfolio under this short run marginal cost pricing scenario 
since it would be unprofitable.  For investors to break even the market must somehow 
come up with another $80,000/Mw of generating capacity or $1.760 billion (an increase 
in revenue of 30%).  Note for future reference that the required $80,000/Mw of 
generating capacity is also exactly equal to the annualized capital charges for a Mw of 
peaking capacity.  Clearly either some type of “capacity” charge equal to the capital cost 
of a peaking turbine must for charged for each unit of capacity used at the time of system 
peak when capacity is fully utilized (effectively $80,000 per peak Mwh consumed when 
demand is 22,000 Mw) or some alternative market mechanism must emerge to increase 
energy prices significantly during some hours of the year. 
To capture how (simplified) well functioning competitive wholesale energy 
markets are supposed to function we must introduce some demand elasticity into the 
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example.  It is convenient for the exposition here, and to capture the way sytem operators 
think about demand response, to conceptualize “demand response” as a technology 
option through which demand is paid to reduce consumption.  The payments reflect the 
marginal value consumers place on consuming less energy in the very short run --- what 
is generally referred to as the “value of lost load” or VOLL (See Stoft (2002), Chapter 2-
5). Accordingly,  I expand the numerical example to include an additional demand 
response technology which reflects a VOLL of $4000/Mwh. Table 5 expands the 
example reflected in Table 1 to include a fourth “demand response” technology with a 
VOLL of $4000/Mwh. As I will discuss presently this value is well within the range of 
available estimates used in practical applications (e.g. in the old E&W pool and in 
Australia).   
We can now derive the least cost mix of the four “generating technologies,” 
including demand response. The result is displayed in Table 6 which should be compared 
to Table 2.  With the demand response option available, 28 Mw of demand response are 
substituted for peaking capacity and demand with durations from 1 hour to 20.4 hours is 
now bought off the system by high “scarcity” prices.  This represents the realizations of 
“State 2” conditions displayed in Figure 2.  Demand response effectively flattens the very 
top of the load duration curve.  This also leads to a change in the short-run marginal cost 
and distribution of the hours when each technology is marginal.  See Table 7.  There are 
now fewer hours when peaking capacity (MC = 80) is marginal and as much as 20.4 
hours when demand response is marginal (MC = 4000).  As already noted, we refer to 
these 20.4 hours either as “scarcity hours” or “shortage hours.”  Table 8 recalculates 
revenues, costs, and any shortfall in cost recovery using the expanded set of short run 
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marginal costs, associated prices, and load durations. The major difference between Table 
8 and Table 4 is that all generating capacity now receives $4000/Mwh during about 20 
hours of “scarcity” conditions.  As indicated by Table 8, with “scarcity pricing” during 
only 20 hours in the year, each generating technology now covers its total costs as does 
the system as a whole. 
 The “scarcity price” of $4000/Mwh may seem like either a lot to pay for avoiding 
reducing electricity consumption or (equivalently) too small a number of hours of the 
year for the system to be in “scarcity” or “shortage” conditions. In this example, if we 
reduced the value of lost load to $2500/Mwh, demand response would be triggered for 
about 33 hours and the maximum quantity of demand response would be 45 Mw, a 
qualitatively similar result.10  It is important to recognize that the VOLL in this case 
reflects a very short run demand elasticity and (typically) a loss of load with little or no 
notice to the retail consumer and lasting for a few hours.  Measuring the value of lost load 
empirically absent meaningful market valuation data is a very difficult exercise.  The 
VOLL will depend on the nature of the consumer activities interrupted, the notice that 
consumers are given before an interruption takes place (Joskow and Tirole (2005a)), 
whether the interruptions are voluntary through market arrangements or involuntary 
through rolling blacouts, and the duration of the outage.  
Nevertheless, there have been numerous efforts to measure the value of lost load.  
Bushnell (2005, page 14) points to a range of estimates between $2,000 and 
$50,000/Mwh. Cramton and Stoft (2006, p. 33) suggest that conventional “planning” 
reliability criteria based on keeping the probability of rolling blackouts very low imply a 
                                                 
10 If I had drawn the load duration curve in the example to have a higher “needle peak” demand lasting a 
20-30 hours, the quantity of demand response would, of course, be larger.  The cutoff operating duration 
would not change, however. 
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value of lost load of $267,000/Mwh. The number of “scarcity” or “shortage” hours 
derived in the example presented here are also similar to those experienced in practice 
(Cramton and Stoft (2006, p.40)  Accordingly, the numbers used in this numerical 
example are well within the range of available estimates from customer surveys and those 
implied by historical electricity system behavior and probably on the low side. 
Clearly, the availability of demand response (demand elasticity) allows supply 
and demand to be balanced at a price that reflects consumers’ willingness to pay for more 
or less supply in the very short run and satisfies a break-even constraint necessary to 
attract investment consistent with a least cost generation investment and operating 
equilibrium.  For future reference, note that the revenues earned under scarcity conditions 
from “scarcity pricing” of energy in this example represent a large fraction of the quasi-
rents necessary to cover the capital costs of the least cost quantity and mix of generating 
capacity.  Table 9 displays the fraction of the quasi-rents earned from market revenues 
under “State 1” short-run marginal cost pricing conditions and "State 2" under scarcity 
conditions.  Both sources of rents are required to cover the capital costs of all three 
supply technologies that make up the least cost supply portfolio.  For base load 
technologies 33% of the rents come from scarcity pricing, for intermediate load 
technology 50%, and from peaking technology 100%.   
The failure to include active price-related demand response in this way or to keep 
prices from rising to $4000, for example by imposing price caps, does not imply that no 
investment will be profitable.  Rather it implies that the efficient quantity and mix of 
generating capacity will not be profitable and, in a market context, an efficient 
investment program would not be sustainable.  Absent price-related demand response, the 
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system operator will have to find some alternative way to ration demand at the time of 
system peak and define some default price or price cap at which suppliers will be 
compensated for energy and operating reserves under these conditions.  This is the case 
because absent the availability of demand response to clear the markey when demand 
reaches 22,000 Mw there is a vertical demand and vertical supply curve and there will by 
no well-defined market clearing price.  Investment will adapt to whatever default pricing 
arrangements are chosen in this case.  Assume that the system operator can implement a 
non-price rational scheme (i.e. rolling-blackouts) when capacity constraints are reached 
(rolling blackouts) to balance demand with the capacity constraint and sets the default 
price or price cap at $500/Mwh under these conditions.  Under these assumptions, an 
equilibrium in which generation suppliers can cover their total costs is characterized by 
less peaking capacity, less total capacity and nearly 200 hours of rolling blackouts each 
year, or 10 times more hours of rolling blackouts than in the example with demand 
response.  The lower is the price cap the less investment will be forthcoming and the 
more hours of shortages requiring non-price rationing (rolling blackouts) will be 
necessary.   
While these numerical examples are static, the presence of uncertainty does not 
change the basic economics of investment and operation discussed above.  Investment 
decisions would in principle reflect the expected values of the relevant variables on the 
demand and supply sides, including any risk bearing costs borne by consumers and/or 
investors.  The value of lost load would be reflected in both investment and operating 
decisions.  Uncertainty will also introduce volatility into both prices and profitability 
(quasi-rents) realized in spot energy and operating reserve markets.  When peak demand 
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is at the high end of the probability distribution peak period prices and profits will be 
relatively high and vice versa.  However, in a least cost equilibrium the expected net 
revenues earned over time during “scarcity” conditions should still be equal to the 
carrying costs of a peaker, and the similar quasi rent results for the other technologies 
will also hold over time.   As I will discuss, however, price formation during scarcity 
conditions in the presence of operating reserves, related reliability constraints and 
discretionary behavior by system operators can complicate significantly the market price 
formation process and the production of quasi-rents consistent with a least cost 
investment portfolio that meets administratively determined reliability criteria. 
 
IS THERE AN INVESTMENT PROBLEM? 
 At first blush, some may find it surprising that policymakers are concerned that 
wholesale market mechanisms will not provide adequate incentives for investment in new 
generating capacity.  The early experience with electricity sector liberalization during the 
1990s suggested that competitive wholesale markets could and would mobilize adequate 
(or more than adequate) investment in new generating capacity.  Substantial amounts of 
capital were mobilized during the late 1990s to support construction of new generating 
capacity in many countries that had implemented reforms.  In the U.S., over 230,000 Mw 
of new generating capacity went into service between 1997 and 2005, most of it merchant 
capacity burning natural gas, an increase of 30% from the 1996 capacity level.  The net 
summer capability of generating capacity in the U.S., increased over 25% between 1997 
and 2005 after taking account of both new entry and retirements (See Table 10).  About 
40% of the stock of generating plants in service in England and Wales at the time its 
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electricity sector was restructured was replaced with modern efficient combined-cycle 
gas turbine (CCGT) technology between 1990 and 2002 as old mostly coal-burning 
generators were retired and replaced by what was expected to be less costly  CCGT 
capacity.  Many other countries implementing reforms during the 1990s, including 
Argentina, Chile and Australia, also attracted significant investment in new generating 
capacity (Jamasb 2002) after the reforms were initiated. 
So, why are policymakers so concerned now?  First, we should recognize that 
liberalization has evolved in much of Europe during a period when there was significant 
excess generating capacity, Spain and Italy being the major exceptions.  Capacity 
constraints have not been on the policymakers' radar screen until recently. Even in 
England and Wales, the quantity of generating capacity in service today is not much 
greater than it was in 1990, with most of the investment in generating capacity during the 
1990s being stimulated by opportunities to replace the inefficient stock of old generators 
that the state-owned CEGB, expectations that natural gas prices would stay low, long 
term contracts entered into by retail suppliers early in the UK’s liberalization program, 
and the high prices for energy and capacity payments available in the wholesale market, 
inflated by the exercise of market power by the dominant generators (Wolfram).  These 
investments were not the result of a significant need for new generating capacity to meet 
rapidly growing peak demand.  
Second, the environment for financing new generating capacity has changed 
dramatically in the last few years as a result of financial problems faced by merchant 
trading and generating companies in Europe, the U.S. and Latin America, as well as 
macroeconomic and political instability in Latin America and Asia (Joskow (2005), 
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Jamasb (2002), De Araujo (2001), Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger (2006)). Potential 
investors have gone to great lengths to convince policymakers that they will not provide 
investment funds for merchant generating capacity in the future under traditional project 
financing arrangements without major changes in the behavior and performance of 
wholesale markets.  Whether they are crying wolf or signaling the reality of investor 
views, their arguments have increased policymakers' concerns about “resource adequacy” 
or “supply security.”  
Most importantly, as demand has grown, as older plants retire, and as wholesale 
market prices have risen, policymakers on many countries see little evidence of a 
response to these market signals in the form of investment in new merchant generating 
capacity.  The situation in the U.S. has attracted particular concern by policymakers in 
those areas of the country where the electricity sectors have been liberalized and rely on 
merchant investment. After peaking at 55,000 Mw of new capacity entering service in the 
U.S. in 2002, the quantity of new generating capacity entering service and the quantity 
under construction has steadily declined.  In 2005, only 15,000 Mw of new generating 
capacity entered service, most of which was built either by municipal utilities that have 
not been subject to restructuring and competition reforms, by traditional vertically 
integrated utilities in states that have not liberalized their electricity sectors or wind 
projects that benefit from special subsidies and contractual arrangements. Concerns about 
investment in additional generating capacity to meet growing demand have been raised in 
New England, New York, PJM, and California.  System operators in the Northeastern 
U.S. and California are projecting shortages and increases in power supply emergencies 
starting in two to three years, recognizing that since developing, permitting and 
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completing new generating plants takes several years if there is little under construction 
today little will come out of the pipeline two or three years from now.    
On the one hand, a market response that leads prices (adjusted for fuel costs) and 
profits to fall and investment to decline dramatically when there is excess capacity, is just 
the response that we would be looking for from a competitive market.   At least some of 
the noise about investment incentives is coming from owners of existing merchant 
generating plants who would just like to see higher prices and profits.  On the other hand, 
numerous analyses of the performance of organized energy-only wholesale markets in the 
U.S. indicate that they do not appear to produce enough net revenues to support 
investment in new generating capacity in the right places and consistent with the 
administrative reliability criteria relied upon by system operators and regulators.   
 The theoretical framework and the numerical examples in the last section make it 
clear that in order to attract investment to balance supply and demand with traditional 
levels of reliability, competitive wholesale markets must produce “rents” over and above 
the short-run marginal cost of operating generating facilities in order to provide 
compensation for the capital costs of these facilities.  Prices and the associated revenues 
produced during “scarcity” conditions when generating capacity is fully utilized are 
especially important.  In particular, over time, wholesale prices must produce rents 
greater than or equal to the capital costs associated with marginal investments in new 
peaking capacity consistent with the least cost quantity and mix of generating capacity to 
balance supply and demand.  Accordingly, a common test for whether wholesale markets 
are providing adequate price signals is to calculate the net revenues (quasi-rents) that 
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would have been earned by a hypothetical investment in new peaking capacity from 
economical sales of energy and operating reserves over a period of several years.   
The experience in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in the 
U.S. is fairly typical. Table 11 displays the net revenue that a hypothetical new 
combustion turbine would have earned from wholesale energy market plus ancillary 
services revenues in PJM if it were dispatched optimally to reflect its marginal running 
costs in each year 1999-2005.  In no year would a new peaking turbine have earned 
enough net revenues from sales of energy and ancillary services to cover the capital costs 
of a new generating unit and, on average, the net revenues contributed only about 40% of 
the annualized capital costs of a new peaking unit.11  Based on energy market revenues 
alone, it would not be rational for an investor to invest in new combustion turbine 
capacity in PJM based on six years of historical experience.  Similar calculations of net 
energy market revenues have been performed for hypothetical investments in new CCGT 
capacity and pulverized coal capacity in PJM. These calculations also indicate that 
energy market revenues alone do not come close to covering the capital costs of new 
investments in these technologies either (PJM 2006, 127-132).   This net revenue gap or 
the “missing money” referred to by Cramton and Stoft (2006) is a major deterrent to 
investment in new generating capacity in the organized wholesale markets in the U.S. 
today.   
As I will discuss on more detail in the next section, one solution to the “missing 
money” problem in the U.S. has been to impose capacity obligations on load serving 
                                                 
11 These calculations are probably an overestimate of the net revenues that a new peaking unit would 
realize in practice since that assume “perfect” economic dispatch and do not take account of various 
operating constraints (PJM 2006, pp. 128-132). 
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entities,12 to create a market for the associated qualifying capacity, and in this way to 
create another stream of revenues for generators that it has been hoped would make up 
for the net revenue gap in the energy market.  For example, load serving entities (LSEs) 
might be required to have contracts for qualifying generating capacity equal to 118% of 
their peak load each year.  The 18% reflects a capacity reserve margin defined to meet 
reliability criteria established by the reliability authorities in the area in which the LSEs 
purchase power. There is then a market for qualifying capacity that defines capacity 
prices.  Indeed, PJM has always had capacity obligations which it carried over into its 
competitive market design.   
In theory, capacity prices should adjust to clear the market consistent with the 
reserve margin chosen and make up for the “missing money” (Joskow and Tirole 
(2005a)).  However, even adding in capacity-related revenues in PJM during the six year 
period covered by Table 11, the total net revenues (energy plus capacity related revenues) 
that would have been earned by a new peaking unit over this six year period were 
significantly less than the capital costs that investors would need to expect to recover to 
make investment in new generating capacity profitable.  The average annual capacity 
market revenue for a combustion turbine in PJM from 1999-2005 was about 
$13,000/Mw/year (PJM (2006), pp. 230-232).  Adding the capacity market revenues to 
the net revenues from sales of energy and ancillary services in Table 11 brings the total 
net revenues for a hypothetical peaking unit to about $40,000/Mw/Year for 1999-2005, 
roughly $35,000/Mw/Year short of the annualized capital costs of new peaking capacity.  
                                                 
12 Load serving entities include distribution companies with retail supply obligations and competitive retail 
electricity suppliers. 
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Again, similar results are revealed for CCGT and pulverized coal technology 
investments. 
This “missing money” phenomenon is not unique to PJM.  Every organized 
market in the U.S. exhibits a similar gap between net revenues produced by energy 
markets and the capital costs of investing in new capacity measured over several years 
time (FERC (2005), p. 60; New York ISO (2005), pages 22-25, Joskow 2005).  Indeed, 
since 1998 there isn't a single year when energy market revenues covered the annualized 
capital costs of a peaking turbine. There is still a significant gap when capacity payments 
are included.  The only exception to the latter result appears to be New York City where 
prices for energy and capacity collectively appear to be sufficient to support new 
investment, though new investment in New York may be much more costly than assumed 
in these analyses (FERC (2005), page 60).  Moreover, a large fraction of the net revenue 
estimated for investment in generating capacity in New York City comes from capacity 
payments rather than energy market revenues (New York ISO (2005), p. 23). 
One potential explanation of these results is that they simply imply that there is 
excess generating capacity in these systems and the low net revenue results are simply 
signaling that two much capacity has come into service.  That is, this is an indicator of 
excess generating capacity.  However, this result is inconsistent with the behavior of 
system operators in the Northeaster U.S., California, and in other countries which are 
forecasting capacity shortages in the near term and are taking actions to stimulate more 
investment.  For example, the New England ISO forecasts significant capacity needs 
beginning in 2008, but there is almost no new generating capacity under construction at 
the present time.  Moreover, in New England the energy and capacity markets are not 
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even producing enough net revenues to keep a significant amount of generating capacity 
from closing down (typically permanently).  The New England ISO has found it 
necessary to sign special “reliability contracts” for up to 7,000 Mw of existing generating 
capacity to keep it in service (ISO New England (2005), page 80).  PJM also forecasts 
that there will be a need for a significant quantity of new generating capacity to meet 
demand in the next few years.  The generating capacity now under construction does not 
satisfy these forecast needs, which are magnified by plans by old generating units to 
retire.  Thus, the failure of wholesale markets to provide adequate revenues is the primary 
suspect for the failure of investors to begin to build new generating facilities to match 
forecasts of resource needs. 
A more subtle counter-argument is that policymakers are overestimating the need 
for additional generating capacity because these estimates are based on old reliability 
criteria that do not properly reflect consumer valuations.  That is, the reliability criteria 
used by the reliability organizations in the U.S. (and other countries since they are very 
similar) are inconsistent with the marginal value of lost load to consumers during these 
periods.  According to this view, the market is signaling that consumers do not want to 
pay for this much reliability and the market, rather than reliability organizations, should 
make that choice.  It may very well be that reliability targets require more generating 
capacity than consumers are willing to pay for and that these engineering reliability 
criteria should be reevaluated.  However, as I will discuss further below, at the present 
time it is unlikely that market mechanisms have yet evolved to produce the appropriate 
level of operating reserves or capacity margins consistent with consumer valuations of 
lost load resulting from potential rolling blackouts  and network collapses.  Moreover, 
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reducing reliability in these dimensions is not politically appealing and, in the U.S., runs 
counter to the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 which seek to strengthen, 
harmonize, and enforce traditional reliability criteria more aggressively. 
 
 
WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF THE “MISSING MONEY” PROBLEM? 
 The ultimate source of the “missing money” problem is that spot market prices do 
not rise high enough during “scarcity” hours to produce adequate quasi-rents to cover the 
capital costs of investment in an efficient level and mix of generating capacity.  Since 
prices for forward contracts reflect the expected value of spot market prices (plus any 
risk-bearing costs) via intertemporal arbitrage, any truncation of the upper tail of the 
distribution of spot prices will be reflected in forward prices that are below the efficient 
level as well.  But why don’t wholesale markets produce adequate revenues? There are a 
number of wholesale market imperfections, regulatory constraints on prices, as well as 
the procedures system operators utilize to deal with operating reserve shortages that 
appear collectively to suppress spot market prices for energy and operating reserves 
below efficient prices during the small number of hours in a typical year when they 
should be very high. 
    To understand the sources of the missing money problem we must examine in 
more detail how system operators in the organized markets in the U.S. balance supply 
and demand on real electric power networks, especially during “scarcity” or “operating 
reserve shortage” hours.  In a market context, the attributes of the price formation process 
during these operating reserve shortage conditions is critical for understanding whether 
and how the wholesale market provides appropriate price signals to attract investment.  If 
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it were the case that operating reserve constraints were always met by variations in prices 
that kept supply and demand in balance continuously, as in simple theoretical models of 
electric power systems with demand response, then there would be no problem.  Indeed, 
there would be no need for system operators to establish operating reserve and other 
reliability criteria.  The market could be relied upon to do so.  However, at least at the 
present time, there are a number of market imperfections that make it unlikely that 
markets will lead to this happy result: 
a. Only a tiny fraction of electricity consumers and electricity demand during 
peak hours can see real time prices and can react quickly enough from the system 
operator’s perspective to large sudden price spikes to keep supply and demand in balance 
consistent with operating reliability constraints.  Neither the metering nor the control 
response equipment is in place except at a small number of locations.  As a result, on a 
typical U.S. network 98+% of peak demand is effectively price inelastic in the time frame 
that system operators are looking for during scarcity conditions.  Since supply is also 
effectively up against capacity constraints during operating reserve deficiency conditions 
we face a situation where we have a vertical demand curve and a vertical supply curve.  
Under these conditions system operators in the U.S. resort to non-price rationing of 
demand  (rolling blackouts) to maintain minimum operating reserve levels and the 
frequency, voltage, stability and other physical engineering operating reliability criteria. 
b. In and of itself, the limited availability of real time meters and associated 
customer monitoring and response equipment is not a fatal problem, however.  LSEs 
could enter into “priority rationing contracts” (Chao and Wilson (1987)) with retail 
consumers that would specify in advance the level of wholesale market prices at which 
 33
customers would allow the system operator to implement demand curtailments.  Retail 
customers entering into such contracts would receive a lower price per unit consumed on 
their standard meters (Joskow and Tirole (2005b)).  They would not have to monitor real 
time prices themselves.  This would be done (ultimately) by the system operator through 
a parallel contract with the retail consumer’s LSE.   However, priority rationing contracts 
require that the system operator can control the flows of power that go to individual 
customers and to have the capability to curtail individual customer demand on short 
notice.  Except for the very largest customers, control over power flows does not go this 
far down into the distribution system and system operators can only curtail demand in 
relatively large “zones” composed of many customers (Joskow and Tirole (2005b)).  That 
is, individual consumers cannot choose their individual preferred level of reliability when 
rolling blackouts are called by the system operator; their lights go off along with their 
neighbors' light.  Zonal rationing is especially problematic in the presence of retail 
competition (Joskow and Tirole (2005a, 2005b)) and gives reliability as reflected in the 
probability and duration of demand curtailments collective good attributes.   
c. System operators hold operating reserves for two reasons.  One is to keep the 
probability of “controlled” non-price rationing of demand (rolling blackouts) low.  The 
other is to keep the probability of a network collapse such as those that occurred in the 
Northeastern U.S. and in Italy in 2003 very low.  When there is a network collapse there 
is both excess demand and excess supply because the network infrastructure to allow 
demand and supply to interact has collapsed.  The outages are widespread and restoring 
the system to operational status can be time consuming and costly.  Nevertheless, since 
the market also collapses in these situations prices are effectively zero.  Individual 
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consumers can do nothing to escape the consequences of a network collapse, aside from 
installing their own on-site generating facilities.  Nor can individual generators profit 
from "scarcity" during a network collapse. As a result, there is no way for market 
mechanisms to fully capture the expected social costs of a network collapse.  Joskow and 
Tirole (2005a) argue that this gives operating reserves public good attributes. As a result, 
the efficient level of operating reserves will not be provided by market mechanisms but 
must be determined through some administrative process that reflects the probability and 
costs of a network collapse. 
d. Rolling blackouts resulting from a shortage of generating capacity are 
extremely rare on electric power systems in developed countries.13 Almost all of the 
“scarcity hours” are realized during operating reserve deficiency conditions when the 
system lies between the target level of operating reserves and the minimum level that 
triggers non-price rationing of demand.  The value for additional scarcity rents earned 
under scarcity conditions are uncertain since they depend on the operating protocols 
implemented by the system operator during operating reserve deficiencies and the 
associated price formation process.14 Once price responsive demand has been exhausted, 
the price formation process during these conditions is extremely sensitive to small 
decisions made by the system operator and it is not evident that a market mechanism 
exists to produce the efficient price levels during these hours. (Joskow and Tirole 
(2005a)).  And a close examination of system operator protocols and behavior during 
scarcity conditions makes it fairly clear that it is highly unlikely that efficient “scarcity 
                                                 
13 Almost all blackouts experienced by consumers result from equipment failures on the distribution 
network. 
14 The sequence of events and system operator behavior leading up to the rolling blackouts in Texas on 
April 17, 2006 provide an extremely informative insight into system operations during such scarcity 
conditions.  Public Utility Commission of Texas (2006). 
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prices” will emerge during operating reserve shortage contingencies.  I offer two 
examples here.    
The last thing that system operators typically do when there is an operating 
reserve deficiency prior to implementing rolling blackouts is to reduce system voltage by 
5%.  This reduces system demand and helps the system operator to keep operating 
reserves above the minimum level that would trigger rolling blackouts.  However, 
reducing demand has the effect of reducing wholesale prices relative to their level at 
normal voltage and demand levels just as the system is approaching a non-price rationing 
state.  Moreover, voltage reductions are not free.  If they were free we could just operate 
the system at a lower voltage.  Voltage reductions lead lights to dim, equipment to run 
less efficiently, on-site generators to turn themselves on, etc.  These are costs that are 
widely dispersed among electricity consumers and are not reflected in market prices.  
Thus, the marginal social cost (in the aggregate) of voltage reductions is not reflected in 
market prices.   
Second, markets for operating reserves typically define the relevant products (e.g. 
spinning reserves) fairly crudely.  For example, spinning reserves may be defined as 
supplies from “idle” generating capacity that can be made available to the system 
operator within 10 minutes.  The market for spinning reserves may not have a locational 
dimension to it or it may reflect a very crude distinction between geographic zones.   
Generator attributes are typically much more differentiated within the general product 
definitions used in organized wholesale markets in the U.S.  The system operator may 
find it necessary to call on generating capacity that responds in, say, two minutes at 
particular locations on the network, to maintain the physical parameters of the network.   
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The system operator typically has information about a more detailed set of generator 
characteristics than is reflected in product market definitions and can act upon this 
information when it thinks that it is necessary to do so to avoid rolling blackouts or a 
network collapse. When supplies from generators with more specific characteristics are 
needed by the system operator, it may rely on bilateral out-of-market (OOM) contracts to 
secure these supplies from specific generators and then dispatch the associated generating 
units as “must run” facilities at the bottom of the bid-stack. This behavior can 
inefficiently depress wholesale market prices received for energy and operating reserves 
by other suppliers in the market.  The behavior of the New England ISO during a severe 
cold snap in January 2004 is an example of this behavior and its consequences (FERC 
(2005), p. and ISO New England (2004)).  Despite the fact that the New England electric 
power network was severely stressed during this period, prices did not rise to levels that 
produced market-based quasi-rents for either CCGTs or peaking turbines; the spark 
spreads were zero or negative. 
e. The limited amount of real time demand response in the wholesale market leads 
to spot market demand that is extremely inelastic.  Especially during high demand 
periods as capacity constraints are approached, this creates significant opportunities for 
suppliers to exercise unilateral market power. In the U.S., FERC has adopted a variety of 
general and locational price mitigation measures to respond to potential market power 
problems in spot markets for energy and operating reserves. These mitigation measures 
include general bid caps (e.g. $1000/Mwh) applicable to all wholesale energy and 
operating reserve prices, location specific bid caps (e.g. marginal cost plus 10%), and 
other bid mitigation and supply obligation (e.g. must offer obligations) measures.   
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Unfortunately, the supply and demand conditions which should lead to high spot 
market prices in a well functioning competitive wholesale market (i.e. when there is true 
competitive “scarcity”) are also the conditions when market power problems are likely to 
be most severe (as capacity constraints are approached in the presence of inelastic 
demand, suppliers’ unilateral incentives and ability to increase prices above competitive 
levels, perhaps by creating contrived scarcity, increase).  Accordingly, uniform price caps 
will almost inevitably “clip” some high prices that truly reflect competitive supply 
scarcity and consumer valuations for energy and reliability as they endeavor to constrain 
high prices that reflect market power.  They may also fail to mitigate fully supra-
competitive prices during other hours (Joskow and Tirole (2005a)). 
If there is a significant unmitigated market power problem then wholesale prices 
should be too high.  But the analysis above suggests that wholesale prices are too low not 
too high on average.  As a result, many economists assume that the primary source of the 
“missing money” problem must be the price caps and related market power mitigation 
procedures imposed by regulators.  That is, that the efforts to mitigate market power have 
had the effect of suppressing energy prices too much, especially during scarcity 
conditions when prices should be very high.15   
The problem with blaming the entire problem on the price caps is that when one 
examines the full distribution of energy prices in the organized  U.S. wholesale energy 
and operating reserve markets over the last six year it is evident that the price caps, which 
do in fact appear too low compared to estimates of the value of lost load, are rarely 
binding constraints (Joskow (2005), PJM (2006), New York ISO (2005), New England 
                                                 
15 Price caps that constrain prices to levels below competitive market prices in some periods but allow 
prices to rise above competitive market levels in other periods do not necessarily lead to a shortage of 
generating capacity.  In this case, however, price caps would induce the wrong mix of generating capacity. 
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ISO (2005). Even during most “scarcity hours,” market prices are below the price caps.  
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the price cap are the only source of the missing money 
problem. I believe that the effects (not the goal) of the other system operator behavioral 
factors discussed above play a much more important role in suppressing prices during 
scarcity conditions in the organized wholesale markets in the U.S. than do the price caps 
on energy and operating reserves. 
There also exist de facto price caps on capacity prices in those wholesale markets 
in the U.S. that have implemented capacity obligations and associated capacity markets.  
The way these markets have worked historically, the penalty imposed on LSEs for not 
contracting for adequate capacity, has been a monthly or annual deficiency charge 
assessed by the system operator.  The deficiency charge is typically calculated based on 
the annualized lifetime capital cost of a new peaking turbine using a set of assumptions 
about the cost of capital, depreciation, plant life, and taxes.  This approach appears to be 
consistent with the discussion of the quasi-rents that must be earned by a peaking turbine 
to make competitive entry financially attractive and to support least cost investment in all 
technology options.  In practice, however, it is not.   
The capacity obligations that are central to these systems have historically relied 
on hard reserve margin criteria (e.g. 18% of peak load).  Due to uncertainty on both the 
demand and supply sides, even if the target reserve margin is hit on average over a period 
of years, there will be some years when the actual reserve margin is greater than the 
target and some years when it is less than the target.  In those wholesale markets with 
capacity obligations, capacity prices have tended to rise to the level of the deficiency 
charge during periods when supplies are tight and then drop to zero or close to it during 
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periods when the reserve margin exceeds the target.  On average, the revenues are then 
significantly less than the lifetime carrying charges of a peaker.  If the distribution of 
realized reserve margins is symmetrical around the target, generators will earn only 50% 
of the capital costs of a peaker over time. Thus, by calculating the deficiency charge in 
this way, a de facto price cap is placed on capacity prices as well.  This is the primary 
reason why traditional capacity obligations and capacity markets have not solved the 
missing money problem.   
 
OTHER POSSIBLE DETERRENTS TO GENERATION INVESTMENT 
 While in my view the “missing money” problem is the most serious deterrent to 
investment in generating capacity, other financial barriers to efficient investment in 
generating capacity have also been identified by various commentators.  Wall Street 
investment bankers routinely argue that investment in new generating capacity will not be 
forthcoming because prices in wholesale spot markets are too volatile and there are 
inadequate opportunities for investors to find counterparties willing to enter into forward 
contracts of ten or more years duration to allow investors to hedge market risks.  They 
claim that absent long term contracts with creditworthy buyers it will be difficult to find 
financing for any merchant generating project. 
 I don’t know of any good theoretical reason why market price volatility or price 
uncertainty per se should make it impossible to finance new generating facilities if the 
“missing money” problem is solved.  Perhaps price uncertainty will affect the cost of 
capital used by investors to evaluate projects, but this would just increase the prices and 
quasi-rents that the market would have to produce to stimulate investment.   Investors 
finance oil refineries, oil and gas drilling platforms, cruise ships, and many other costly 
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capital projects where there is considerable price uncertainty without the security of long 
term contracts.   
 One attribute of electricity markets that may have implications for the efficient 
allocation of market price risk between investors, intermediaries and consumers is the 
retail procurement framework that has accompanied the liberalization of wholesale 
electricity markets.  In the U.S. and several other countries, comprehensive retail 
competition programs have been created but have been slow to evolve.  Large fractions 
of system demand continue to be served by incumbent distributors with default service 
obligations and who contract for power with relatively short-term contracts.  The 
contracting requirements are driven by regulatory requirements rather than through 
market-based allocations of risk.  There is no reason to believe that they are optimal.  As 
retail competition matures and retail suppliers with large diversified portfolios emerge, 
they are likely to be more willing voluntarily to take on longer term commitments to buy 
power from generators (or build their own generating portfolios) if this can reduce the 
prices they must pay to buy power over time.  While individual retail consumers may 
only have one, two or three year contracts, a diversified portfolio of retail customers, 
especially smaller customers who are reasonably “sticky,” would provide a retail supplier 
with the kind of stable demand base that it would need to make it potentially attractive to 
sign long term supply contracts.   
This observation leads directly to questions about the optimal contractual, financing 
market structure for electricity suppliers at wholesale and retail.  The initial model for 
independent power producers that emerged in the U.S. after the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policy Act (PURPA) went into effect in the early 1980s, was based on long-term 
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purchase contracts between independent power producers and regulated utilities. Project 
financing with high debt/equity ratios secured by these contracts was the financing 
framework of choice.  The next wave of investment in merchant generating capacity 
beginning in the late 1990s relied on the project financing model but without the long 
term contracts.  When wholesale markets collapsed after 2001 many of those projects 
could not meet their debt obligations and many went bankrupt or were subject to 
alternative financial restructurings.   
I believe that the merchant investment model based on wholesale generating 
companies relying on highly leveraged individual project financing arrangements is likely 
to be poorly suited to a competitive wholesale and retail market framework. Partial 
vertical integration between retail supply and generation ownership (but not T&D) 
combined with diversified portfolios of spot, short and medium term contracts with 
independent suppliers to make up for the rest of the retail supplier’s wholesale power 
requirements is likely to be a superior organizational form for financing investment and 
dealing with imperfections in wholesale spot markets, including the potential "hold-up" 
problems that I will discuss presently.  These vertically integrated retail supply and 
generation companies are likely to be large firms with substantial balance sheets and rely 
more on balance sheet financing for their generation portfolios.  The power supply 
industry will look more like the oil and gas industry, with a relatively small number of 
large vertically integrated firms, and a large number of “small” independent generating 
companies. This industrial structure is gradually emerging in the U.S. and Europe. There 
need not be a conflict between competition goals and an industry with large vertically 
integrated power supplies as long as the firms' wholesale and retail supply businesses are 
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sufficiently dispersed geographically that there are several competing suppliers in any 
region and the transmission network is owned and operated independently. 
 A final reason why it may be difficult to finance investments in new generating 
capacity are concerns about opportunistic behavior by government regulators or system 
operators that may affect spot market prices at critical times over the life of a new 
generating unit.  As discussed in detail above, a large fraction of the net revenues or 
quasi-rents from sales of energy in spot electricity markets required to cover the costs of 
capital investments is produced in a very small number of hours each year when capacity 
is fully utilized.  Moreover, due to uncertainty on the demand and supply sides, these 
hours will not appear uniformly from year to year but will fluctuate widely from year to 
year.  One year it may be 80 hours and another year 5 hours of scarcity conditions 
(Joskow (2005), Cramton and Stoft (2006, p. 33)).  For a peaking plant, all of its net 
revenues are derived under these conditions.  Accordingly, investors must be very 
concerned about actions by regulators or discretionary behavior by system operators that 
might have the effect of constraining prices in exactly those few hours with very high 
prices when investors expect to earn most of the net revenues required to cover their 
capital investment costs.  It is now widely recognized that opportunism problems, 
whether by counterparties or government entities, can lead to under-investment and that 
credible long-term contracts or vertical integration are efficient institutional responses to 
opportunism problems (Williamson (1979), Hart (1985), Joskow (1987)).  From the 
investor's perspective, long term power supply contracts with credit worthy buyers can 
allows them to shift this risk to buyers. 
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POLICY RESPONSES 
 Numerous policy proposals have been made to fix what is now widely viewed in 
the U.S. as the failure of organized wholesale power markets to provide adequate 
incentives to stimulate investment in new generating capacity to balance supply and 
demand efficiently.  I will focus primarily on the missing money or net revenue gap 
problem here.  However, I will also take into account related concerns about market 
power mitigation, price volatility, and opportunism. 
  
 a. Improving the performance of organized spot markets:  The fundamental source 
of the net revenue gap problem is the failure of spot energy and operating reserve markets 
to perform in practice the way they are supposed to perform in theory.  It is natural to 
focus on improving the performance of these markets.  While I believe that the 
performance of spot wholesale energy markets can be improved, I do not believe that all 
of the problems, especially those associated with the implementation of engineering 
reliability rules and the associated behavior of system operators during scarcity 
conditions, can be fully resolved quickly if ever.  Nevertheless, improving the behavior 
and performance of spot wholesale markets for energy and operating reserves can be a 
constructive component of a broader set of reforms.   
  i. Raise the price caps and hit them during scarcity conditions::  The 
$1000/Mwh price cap in effect in most of the organized markets in the U.S. ($250/Mwh 
in California) is a completely arbitrary number that is clearly below what the competitive 
market clearing price would be under most scarcity conditions (State 2). However, as I 
have discussed, the $1000 price caps are rarely binding constraints in the organized U.S. 
markets so that increasing them alone would not have much of an impact on the net 
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revenue gap problem. Increasing the price caps to reflect reasonable estimates of VOLL 
would also make it more attractive and profitable for suppliers to exercise market power 
in spot energy and operating reserve markets.  Nevertheless, there are good reasons to 
increase the price caps to reflect reasonable values of VOLL if this is combined with 
changes to the price formation process, more reliance on other approaches to mitigating 
market power, and continued reliance on market monitors as in all of the U.S. ISOs. 
 To make the higher price caps meaningful contributors to the net revenue gap 
problem and to deal with the price formation problems that emerge when system 
operators implement reliability protocols when there are capacity constraints, I would 
propose that whenever a system operator issues a notice that operating reserve deficiency 
protocols will be implemented that the wholesale market prices for energy and operating 
reserves be moved immediately to the price cap.  This is a rough and ready mechanism to 
get prices up to where they should be under scarcity conditions and is a practical response 
to the challenges of integrating reliability rules, responses like voltage reductions which 
are not properly priced through market mechanisms, and various discretionary behavior 
that we must allow system operators to undertake to maintain network reliability and 
avoid network collapses.   
 As with raising the price caps, this increases supplier incentives to withhold 
supplies as capacity constraints are being approached and market monitors will have to 
focus their attention on withholding of capacity during hours when capacity constraints 
are being approached.  However, there are mechanisms other than price caps that can 
help to mitigate market power.  It has been widely recognized that more reliance on 
forward contracting for energy can help to mitigate spot energy market power problems 
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(Wolak (2004), Allaz and Vila (1993)) and there have been many recommendations that 
wholesale markets should rely much more on forward contracting.  More forward 
contracting would be a good thing from both a market power mitigation perspective and 
from the perspective of those who believe that price volatility, price uncertainty, and 
opportunism are deterrents to investment. One problem here is that proponents of more 
forward contracting provide little guidance regarding how this goal will be achieved in 
the context of retail competition. With competitive retail markets it is generally up to 
retail customers and their supply intermediaries to decide on their contractual 
arrangements, including contract duration.  If retail suppliers are not voluntarily entering 
into longer term contracts we need to understand why and if implementing the 
recommendation that more reliance be placed on long term contracts involves compelling 
LSEs to enter into bilateral forward contracts with generators the implications of doing so 
also need to be better understood; in particular the implications for the diffusion of retail 
competition.  I will discuss below how the creation of a forward capacity obligation and 
associated capacity markets can be structured to also hedge energy prices during peak 
periods and mitigate incentives to exercise market power. 
  ii.  Increase real time demand response resources: Increasing efforts to bring 
more demand response that meets the system operator’s criteria for “counting on it” 
during scarcity conditions16 can also help both to increase the efficiency with which 
capacity constraints are managed and improve the price formation process during scarcity 
conditions.  However, the way in which demand response is brought into the system for 
                                                 
16 This may require, for example, that demand respond to either price signals or requests for curtailment 
from the system operator within ten minutes or less.  Demand response times has been identified as an issue 
in the investigation of the rolling blackouts in Texas (ERCOT) on April 17, 2006.  See Electric 
Transmission Week, May 1, 2006, page 2, SNL Energy. 
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these purposes is important.  Demand response should be integrated into the system in a 
way that is symmetrical to the treatment of supplies of energy, operating reserves, and 
capacity.  Demand response should be an active component of the price formation 
process and compete directly with resources on the supply side.  The best way for this 
goal to be achieved is to structure demand response contracts as call contracts in which 
curtailments are contingent on wholesale prices rising to pre-specified levels.  If capacity 
payments are made to generators then equivalent capacity payments should be made to 
qualifying demand response.  It also matters exactly how capacity payments are reflected 
in retail prices (Joskow and Tirole (2005a)).  Today, demand response resources tend to 
be pre-contracted, the costs partially recovered through uplift charges spread over many 
hours, and calls on demand response triggered by system operating conditions and 
reliability protocols rather than prices.  The New York ISO has done a good job 
improving the ways in which demand response is integrated into spot energy markets and 
this is the kind of reform that I have in mind (New York ISO (2005b)). 
 iii. increase the number of operating reserve products sold in organized 
wholesale markets:  Market performance would also be improved if market designs 
recognized that system operators need more refined “products” than are presently 
reflected in the ancillary service product definitions around which wholesale markets are 
now organized.  For example, if the system operator needs “quick start” supply (or 
demand response) resources that can supply within five minutes rather than 10 minutes, it 
is better to define that as a separate product and to create a market for it that is fully 
integrated with related energy and ancillary service product markets rather than relying 
on out-of-market bilateral arrangements and "must run" scheduling in the bid-based 
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supply stack.  The supply of energy and various operating reserve services are substitutes, 
arbitrage links their market prices together, and opportunities exist to change the use and 
physical attributes of generating facilities in response to price incentives for specific 
operating reserve attributes.   
iv.  review and adjust reliability rules and protocols: This leads to one final 
observation regarding the missing money problem that affects all proposed solutions to it.  
Many of the policy assessments of whether or not there is adequate investment in 
generating capacity turns on comparisons between market outcomes (investment in new 
and retirements of old generating capacity) and traditional engineering reliability criteria.  
These reliability criteria and associated operating protocols have been carried over from 
the old regime of regulated vertically integrated monopolies and may have reflected in 
part efforts to justify excess generating capacity.  It is not at all clear that even a perfectly 
functioning competitive wholesale market would yield levels of investment and reserve 
margins that are consistent with these reliability rules.  Indeed, Cramton and Stoft’s 
(2006, p. 33) observation that the capacity reserve margin criterion used in the Northeast 
reflects a VOLL of $267,000/Mwh suggests that this reserve margin is much too high 
from the perspective of consumers’ valuations for reliability.  The criteria used for 
operating reserve targets may also be inconsistent with consumer valuations.  At the very 
least it would make sense to reevaluate these reliability criteria and to search for more 
market friendly mechanisms for achieving whatever reliability criteria are adopted. 
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b.  Capacity obligations, forward capacity markets and capacity prices17  The 
reforms to wholesale energy markets discussed above should help to reduce the net 
revenue gap.  However, it is not at all obvious that the missing money problem will be 
solved with these reforms or that they can be implemented overnight.  These reforms may 
also increase market power problems and further increase price volatility.  I believe that 
reforms to spot markets need to be accompanied by a system of forward capacity 
obligations placed (ultimately) on LSEs and the effective design of associated capacity 
markets.  If properly designed, forward capacity markets can act as a safety valve to fill 
the net revenue gap and support efficient investment in generation and demand response, 
are compatible with the continued evolution of wholesale spot markets, are consistent 
with the continued evolution of retail competition, and can help to reduce investor 
concerns about price volatility and opportunism.  If spot energy and ancillary reserve 
market performance improves dramatically, capacity obligations and capacity markets 
can also effectively fade away. 
i.  forward contracts for energy alone do not solve the net revenue gap or missing 
money problem:  Before discussing how forward capacity obligations and associated 
capacity markets can be structured to do all of these good things I want to briefly discuss 
one type of frequently mentioned proposal that will not solve the net revenue gap 
problem. Several proposals have been made to require LSEs (or system operators) to 
enter into some type of “hedged” forward contracts for energy to cover a large fraction of 
their retail customers’ energy demand.  The proposals include fixed price forward 
                                                 
17 The new forward capacity market framework filed in March 2006 with FERC by the New England ISO 
as a settlement among many parties contains many of these features (ISO New England (2006)) . See 
Cramton and Stoft (2006) for a detailed discussion of the rationale for the provisions of the New England 
ISO's forward capacity market proposal. 
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contracts for energy between LSEs and generators as well as option contracts that specify 
a call price for energy ex ante (e.g. Wolak (2004), Oren (2005)).  It is claimed that these 
hedging contracts will solve the “resource adequacy” problem.  These assertions are 
simply wrong.18 They are wrong because they do not deal with the underlying market 
imperfections and institutional constraints that lead to the missing money problem and 
implicitly assume, without explanation, that the relevant market failure results from 
inadequate forward contracting by retail consumers and their retail suppliers.  They 
ignore the reasons why “the market” cannot be relied upon to select the optimal level of 
reliability.19 Moreover, policymakers will not allow the market to make this choice.  They 
will continue to impose reliability standards and associated operating reserve 
requirements and capacity reserve requirement criteria as they do now.  There may be 
good reasons to change these requirements and the mechanisms utilized to meet them, but 
economists are dreaming if they think that policymakers will be ready soon to leave 
reliability criteria it to the market.   The hedging contract proposals do reduce price 
volatility and are likely to mitigate market power.  These are good outcomes.  However, 
unless they incorporate generating capacity reserve criteria (“resource adequacy criteria”) 
as well they will not solve the missing money problem.  The forward contract prices will 
just reflect the low spot wholesale energy prices that create the net revenue gap in the 
first place. 
ii. Implement well-designed forward capacity markets:  Recent so-called 
“capacity market” proposals start with the reliability criteria established by the 
                                                 
18 Bidwell (2005) and Singh (2000) also have made proposals that have option contract components.  
However, they also have components that deal with the missing money problem by incorporating reliability 
criteria.  See Cramton and Stoft (2006) for a more detailed comparison of these proposals. 
19 See Cramton and Stoft (2006) which discuss this issue in more detail, focusing on the implications on 
limited real time pricing and the inability to control power flows to individual consumers. 
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responsible reliability organizations.20  The primary generating capacity-related criterion 
is typically a generating capacity reserve margin measured by the difference between the 
system peak demand (D) before any curtailments and the peak generating capability (G) 
of the system assuming that all installed generating capacity is operating at the time of 
system peak.  Qualifying demand response resources are in principle included in this 
generating capability number.  The generating reserve capability criterion (R*) is then 
defined as R* = (G-D)/D and typically lies between 15% and 20% in the U.S.  The target 
generating capability of the system is then G* = (1+R*)D.  In theory, the value for R* 
should reflect considerations of demand uncertainty, supply uncertainty, and the value of 
lost load from rolling blackouts and network collapses. In reality, the origins of these 
criteria are rather murky.  Generating reserve criteria may be defined for the entire 
network controlled by the system operator and for individual sub-regions to reflect 
transmission constraints at the time of locational demand peaks.  All LSEs then have the 
obligation to pay for their proportionate share of this generating capacity/demand 
response obligation based on their own LSE load at the time of system peak.  Under the 
forward capacity market proposal the auctions are for delivery several years into the 
future and prices may be fixed, at the supplier's choice, for a few years starting with the 
delivery date.   
LSEs can meet their forward capacity obligations either by contracting directly 
with generators for capacity to be available to supply energy at the time of system peak or 
by purchasing this capacity through an auction process conducted by the system operator. 
In the latter case, the system operator runs a series of auctions for qualifying generating 
                                                 
20 In the U.S. this organization would be the regional reliability council under which an SO operates and a 
national reliability organization provided for by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
 51
capacity to meet the reliability criterion for installed generating capacity G.* The auction 
mechanism defines the price for generating capacity for one or more future periods.  All 
LSEs are required to pay the market clearing price in the auction for their load-based 
share of the system generating capacity reserve obligation net of any generating capacity 
that they own or have contracted for separately outside of the auction ("self-supply"). 
Self-supply can be easily accommodated by requiring generators with bilateral contracts 
to offer their capacity to the organized capacity market with a contract for differences 
with the LSEs with which they have pre-contracted and then including all LSE demand in 
the market as well.  Effectively, the system operator buys capacity through the auction 
and bills LSEs for their share net of any self-supply by contract or ownership they have 
registered with the system operator prior to the auction.  Generating capacity that clears 
in the market has an obligation to offer energy to the wholesale spot market when 
requested to do so by the system operator or pay a significant performance penalty if they 
do not. 
Under the forward capacity market proposal the spot energy markets continue to 
operate as before, with whatever improvements are introduced.   Following the numerical 
examples above, in equilibrium the market clearing price (Pc) for generating capacity 
should equal the capital costs of a peaker (Pk) less the quasi-rents that a peaker would 
expect to earn (Rp) in the energy market or Pc = (Pk - Rp) adjusted for expected forced 
outage rates and associated penalties (Joskow and Tirole (2005a)).21  This solves the 
missing money problem since the capacity price essentially acts as a safety valve to fill 
the gap between the capital costs of a peaker and the quasi-rents that a peaker expects to 
                                                 
21 Intermediate and base load capacity get the capacity price plus the quasi-rents they earn in the energy 
market consistent with the equilibrium conditions discussed above.  In equilibrium all generating 
technologies that are included in the least cost portfolio cover their capital costs. 
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earn in the energy and operating reserve markets.  Moreover, as the performance of the 
wholesale spot energy market improves, the expected quasi-rents produced for a peaker 
in the energy market will rise toward Rp = Pk and the capacity price will fall toward zero. 
As already noted, simple versions of capacity obligation/capacity market 
approach have been operating for years in several U.S. ISOs, but have not solved the 
missing money problem or the other problems noted above.  The forward capacity market 
proposals on the table today include several enhancements to these older capacity 
mechanisms. I now discuss several of the enhancements that characterize the forward 
capacity market framework.  
The earlier mechanisms relied on cost-based calculations of deficiency payments 
that effectively placed a price cap on capacity prices. This cap kept realized capacity 
payments below the level necessary to make up for the net revenue gap from wholesale 
energy and operating reserve markets.  The enhanced mechanisms retain a price cap to 
deal with potential market power problems, but the price cap is based on an analysis of 
the probability distributions of demand and supply so that on average the mechanism 
should yield a capacity price equal to Pk before netting out any quasi-rents produced in 
the energy market.  The proposed annual capacity price cap included in the forward 
capacity market proposal for  New England is more than twice the old deficiency 
payment cap. 
A second problem noted with the existing capacity obligation/market systems is 
that they employed a hard value for the reserve margin and implied quantity of installed 
generating capacity (R* and G*) required to meet reliability criteria.  This approach 
implied that the reliability value of generating capacity slightly above G* was zero and 
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that the value of any decrease in generation below G* was effectively equal to the price 
cap.  That is the demand for capacity was equal to the price cap for G < G* and equal to 
zero for G> G*.  This led to very volatile capacity prices that jumped between close to 
zero and the price cap from year to year.  The New York ISO has introduced a reserve 
demand curve that essentially smooths capacity prices around the target generating 
capacity reserve margin.  The demand curve’s structure is based on an assessment of the 
distribution of loss of load probabilities and the value of lost load.  It is similar in concept 
to the capacity payment mechanism that was a component of the original wholesale 
market design in England and Wales. A similar approach was proposed for New England. 
However, the initial proposal was renegotiated and, among other changes, the demand 
curve was replaced with an auction mechanism with caps and floors (a “price collar”) on 
capacity prices and an intertemporal adjustment mechanism to reflect information about 
capacity market values drawn from actual market behavior over time. Together, these 
provisions also have the effect of smoothing out the distribution of capacity prices and 
better reflecting the value of capacity above and below a hard installed generating 
capability target. 
A third problem identified with the existing capacity obligation/market 
arrangements was that the capacity market was effectively a short-term procurement 
market that did not give potential entrants an opportunity to participate in the auction, 
increasing the potential for incumbent generators to exercise market power in the 
capacity market as well as in the energy market.  The reforms proposed in New England 
and PJM respond to this problem by turning the capacity auctions into forward markets 
for capacity that occur sufficiently far in advance of delivery that new entrants can 
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participate in the auction.  In the New England proposal, the capacity auction will be for 
capacity that is to be available to the market over three years in the future. 
A fourth problem identified with the existing capacity market arrangements was 
that they provided investors considering entering the market with no way of locking in 
capacity prices for any time period in advance of completion.  Whether this concern 
reflects uncertainty per se or potential opportunism problems is unclear.  However, the 
New England forward capacity market proposal allows new entrants to lock in capacity 
prices determined in the auction for a period of up to five years after the forward capacity 
delivery date at their choice.   
A fifth problem identified with the existing capacity obligation/market 
arrangements was that generators had poor incentives to be available during hours when 
capacity is constrained because  capacity payments were not tied to actual performance 
but rather to historical availability experience.  This problem is exacerbated by the failure 
of energy prices to rise to high enough levels during these critical periods.  The new 
proposals include penalties for generators who are not available to perform when they are 
most needed. 
A sixth problem identified with the existing arrangements (and the primary initial 
motivation for the reforms in New England and PJM) was that capacity obligations were 
applied for the system operator’s entire network and did not reflect transmission 
congestion and local reliability and associated installed capacity criteria .  At first blush, 
this problem may seem a little surprising since the Eastern and Midwestern markets in the 
U.S. rely on locational marginal price (LMP) mechanisms for energy that yield prices 
that are supposed to reflect congestion (Joskow 2006).  However, the same market and 
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institutional failures that suppress energy prices generally, also affect prices in 
constrained areas.  To respond to this problem, the new capacity market mechanisms 
allow for capacity obligations and capacity prices to be determined for sub-regions where 
there are congestion problems (e.g. Southwestern Connecticut, New York City, Northern 
New Jersey.) 
A final criticism of the existing capacity market arrangements is that they fail to 
do anything about market power in the energy market or to stimulate more hedging of 
energy price volatility for retail customers (‘hedging load”).  The New England proposal 
has an interesting component that responds to these concerns.  Each year the system 
operator will calculate the quasi-rents earned by a hypothetical peaking unit for sales of 
energy and operating reserves in the spot market (“Peak Energy Rents” or “PER”) and 
deduct these rents from the capacity price determined in the auction.  The PER is 
calculated based on a strike price for the hypothetical peaking unit that is equal to its 
marginal generation cost.   
This provision has several effects.  First, it hedges load against peak period 
energy price spikes since as peak period prices increase in the energy market the net price 
of capacity decreases.  Second, it provides a net revenue hedge to peaking capacity that 
performs as expected and a partial hedge to base load and intermediate capacity.  Third, it 
reduces incentives to exercise market power in the energy market since higher spot 
market prices do not benefit generators that are fully hedged in this way.  Finally, it 
provides good performance incentives.  A generator that does not meet the performance 
targets and parameters used to calculate PER for a hypothetical peaker will lose money 
on the PER adjustment (as well as from other performance incentives).  A peaker that can 
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realize better performance keeps the additional net revenues.  As Cramton and Stoft 
(2006) argue persuasively, by hedging prices paid by load during peak hours this 
additional component of a forward capacity market design effectively integrates the 
forward contract/options/load hedging proposals discussed above within a framework 
that also deals with the missing money problem. 
Most of the discussion of capacity obligation/market mechanisms has focused on 
the supply side. To fully restore appropriate incentives to market participants, the demand 
side of the market should be treated symmetrically.  Demand response resources that are 
compatible with the system operator’s reliability criteria should be compensated at levels 
equivalent to what is paid to generators to make capacity available during capacity 
constrained periods.  Moreover, the price paid for capacity should ideally be reflected in 
prices paid retail consumers during these same critical periods.  This should be a goal of 
further refinements in the forward capacity market framework.  
 Much of the discussion of proposals for dealing with generation investment 
incentives has also ignored the implications for the further evolution of retail 
competition.  The proposals that would require LESs to enter into a portfolio of long term 
contracts with individual generators for supplies of energy to meet their peak loads are in 
my view incompatible with retail competition.  In areas where a large fraction of the 
retail load has not switched to competitive suppliers the responsible LSE would be the 
incumbent regulated distribution company.  The costs of the long term contracts signed 
by the LSE would then be passed through to “default service” retail customers on a cost 
of service basis.  This raises potential stranded cost problems (again) and can distort 
decisions by consumers regarding switching to competitive retail suppliers or default 
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service as wholesale market prices will inevitably deviate from the average cost of the of 
the regulated incumbent's portfolio of long term contracts at any point in time that is used 
to set regulated default retail prices  This approach also places additional financial 
burdens on competitive retailers since it will increase their credit obligations to become 
counterparties to long-term supply contracts. Retailers may not be able to put together a 
retail contract portfolio that matches their wholesale contract obligations or to recover the 
market value of the contractual risks that have been imposed upon them in market-based 
retail prices.  Accordingly, requiring all LSEs to enter into long term contracts will 
increase the market risk faced by competitive retail suppliers placing an additional burden 
on the already slow diffusion of retail competition.   
The forward capacity market mechanism is much more compatible with retail 
competition than are the proposals that place forward contracting proposals on individual 
LSEs.  Capacity prices are set through an organized market process and the associated 
financial obligations to make the capacity payments are ultimately a collective obligation 
of all retail suppliers in the aggregate rather than a long term capacity commitment of 
each individual retail suppliers.  As retail customers switch from retailer to retailer, the 
capacity obligations associated with their demand move along with them along with the 
financial obligations (capacity prices) associated with the forward price obligations 
determined through forward capacity auctions. Individual retail suppliers do not have to 
post credit to support (say) five-year contractual commitments since the credit is provided 
by the collective obligations of retail suppliers defined in the system operator’s tariff.22  
Since the obligations for capacity payments are based on each retail supplier’s share of 
                                                 
22 All retail suppliers and generators would still have to meet the system operator’s standard credit 
requirements and provisions for obligations incurred by suppliers who go bankrupt must be defined. 
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peak demand and the price of capacity is established ex ante, movements of retail 
customers among retail suppliers and the associated movement in capacity payment 
obligations can be handled easily by the system operator. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 Evidence from the U.S. and some other countries indicates that organized 
wholesale markets for electrical energy and operating reserves do not provide adequate 
incentives to stimulate the proper quantity or mix of generating capacity consistent with 
mandatory reliability criteria.  Based on U.S. experience, a large part of the problem can 
be associated with the failure of wholesale spot markets for energy and operating reserves 
to produce prices for energy during periods when capacity is constrained that are high 
enough to support investment in an efficient (least cost) mix of generating capacity.  A 
joint program of reforms applied to wholesale energy markets, the introduction of well-
design forward capacity markets, and symmetrical treatment of demand response and 
generating capacity resources is proposed to solve this problem.  This policy reform 
program is compatible with improving the efficiency of spot wholesale markets, the 
continued evolution of competitive retail markets, and restores incentives for efficient 
investment in generating capacity consistent with operating reliability criteria applied by 
system operators.  This reform package also responds to investment disincentives that 
have been associated with volatility in wholesale energy prices by hedging energy prices 
during peak periods as well as responding partially to concerns about regulatory 
opportunism by establishing forward prices for capacity for a period of up to five years.  
These hedging arrangements also reduce the incentives of suppliers to exercise market 
power.
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TABLE 1 
 
HYPOTHETICAL ELECTRIC GENERATION TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS AND 
LOAD DURATION CURVE 
 
 
 
 
Generation Technology Annualized Capital Costs Operating Costs 
     $/Mw/Year         $/MWH 
 
Base load    $240,000   $20 
 
Intermediate    $160,000   $35 
 
Peaking    $  80,000   $80 
 
 
 
Load Duration Curve (See Figure 1) 
 
 D = 22,000 – 1.37H [0 < H < 8760] 
 
 
D = System load 
 
H =      Number of hours system load reaches a level D 
 
TABLE 2 
 
LEAST COST MIX OF GENERATING TECHNOLOGIES AND RUNNING TIMES 
FOR HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM 
 
 
 
Generating Technology  Capacity Running hours  Total Cost 
       (Mw)     ($billions) 
 
Base load    14,694  5333 – 8760    $5.940 
 
Intermediate      4,871  1778 – 5333    $1.385 
 
Peaking      2,435        1 – 1778    $0.366 
 
 TOTAL   22,000       $7.694 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST PRICING 
PRICE DURATION SCHEDULE 
 
 
 
Marginal Technology  Short-run Marginal Cost  Duration 
     $/Mwh       hours 
 
 
Base load    $20    3427 
 
Intermediate    $35    3556 
 
Peaking    $80    1778 
 
 
 
 
 
     TABLE 4 
 
PROFITABILITY OF THE LEAST COST SYSTEM WITH SHORT-RUN MARGINAL 
COST PRICING OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 
 
 
Generating Revenues Total Cost            Net Revenue Shortfall 
Technology ($billions) ($billons)  $(billions)     $/Mw/Year 
 
Base load $4.765  $5.940  ($1.176)  $80,000 
 
Intermediate $0.996  $1.385  ($0.390) $80,000 
 
Peaking $0.173  $0.368  ($0.195) $80,000  
 
  $5.934  $7.694  ($1.760) 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
 
HYPOTHETICAL ELECTRIC GENERATION SYSTEM WITH DEMAND 
RESPONSE “TECHNOLOGY” 
 
 
 
 
Generation Technology Annualized Capital Costs Operating Costs 
     $/Mw/Year         $/MWH 
 
Base load    $240,000   $20 
 
Intermediate    $160,000   $35 
 
Peaking    $  80,000   $80 
 
Demand response (VOLL)       -0-             $4000 
 
 
 
Load Duration Curve (See Figure 1) 
 
 D = 22,000 – 1.37H [0 < H < 8760] 
 
 
D = System load 
 
H =      Number of hours system load reaches a level D 
TABLE 6 
 
LEAST COST MIX OF GENERATING TECHNOLOGIES AND RUNNING TIMES 
FOR HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM WITH DEMAND RESPONSE 
 
 
 
Generating Technology  Capacity Running hours  Total Cost 
       (Mw)     ($billions) 
 
Base load    14,694  5333 – 8760    $5.940 
 
Intermediate      4,871  1778 – 5333    $1.385 
 
Peaking      2,407  20.4 – 1778    $0.3657 
 
Demand Response          28     0 – 20.4    $0.0011 
 
 TOTAL   22,000       $7.692 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
 
SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST + SCARCITY PRICING 
PRICE DURATION SCHEDULE 
 
 
 
Marginal Technology  Short-run Marginal Cost  Duration 
     $/Mwh       hours 
 
 
Base load    $20    3427 
 
Intermediate    $35    3556 
 
Peaking    $80    1757 
 
“Scarcity” (Demand Response) $4000        20 
 
     TABLE 8 
 
PROFITABILITY OF SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST + “SCARCITY” PRICING 
OF ENERGY PRODUCTION FOR LEAST COST SYSTEM  
 
 
Generating  Revenues Total Cost            Shortfall 
Technology  ($billions) ($billons)  $(billions)     $/Mw/Year 
 
Base load  $5.940  $5.940         -0-     -0-  
 
Intermediate  $1.385  $1.385         -0-    -0- 
 
Peaking  $0.366  $0.366         -0-    -0- 
 
Demand  Response $0.0114 $0.0114        -0-    -0-  
 
 
 
     TABLE 9 
 
QUASI-RENT DISTRIBUTION WITH MARGINAL COST + “SCARCITY” PRICING 
FOR HYPOTHETICAL LEAST COST SYSTEM 
 
                        Net Revenues Earned 
Technology  Marginal Cost Pricing Hours  Scarcity Pricing Hours 
 
Base load    67%      33% 
 
Intermediate    50%      50% 
 
Peaking     0%    100% 
TABLE 10 
 
U.S. GENERATING CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
1997 – 2005 
 
 
 
Year   New Generating Capacity (MW) 
 
1997      4,000 
 
1998      6,500 
 
1999    10,500 
 
2000    23,500 
 
2001    48,000 
 
2002    55,000 
 
2003    50,000 
 
2004    20,000 
 
2005    15,000 
 
    230,000 
 
 
 
Total U.S. generating Capacity (MW net summer capacity): 
 
1996    776,000 
 
2005    980,000 
 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration 
TABLE 11 
 
NET ENERGY AND ANCILLARY SERVICES REVENUES 
NEW COMBUSTION TURBINE PEAKING PLANT 
IN PJM 
 
1999-2005 
 
 
 
Year    Simulated Net Energy and AS Revenue 
      $/Mw/Year 
 
1999      $64,313 
 
2000        18,724 
 
2001        41,517 
 
2002        25,480 
 
2003        14,402 
 
2004        10,311 
 
2005        17,989  
 
 Average    $27,534 
 
 
Annualized 20-year fixed cost ~ $70,000 - $80,000/Mw/Year 
 
 
 
Source:  2005 State of the Market Report, pages 124-132,  PJM Interconnection   
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